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International capital flows, while potentially beneficial, are said to increase a country’s vulnerability
to crisis – especially if they are skewed to non-FDI types. This paper studies whether the volume and
composition of capital flows affect the degree of credit crunch faced by a country’s manufacturing
firms during the 2007-09 crisis. Using data on 3823 firms in 24 emerging countries, we find that, on
average, the decline in stock prices was more severe for firms that are intrinsically more dependent
on external finance for working capital. The volume of capital flows per se has no significant effect
on the severity of the credit crunch. However, the composition of capital flows matters a great deal:
pre-crisis exposure to non-FDI capital inflows worsens the credit crunch, while exposure to FDI alleviates
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“The claim that disruptions to the banking system necessarily destroy the ability of non-
financial businesses to borrow from households is highly questionable.” 
       
        Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (October 2008) 
 
“There is no clear evidence to date that supply constraints have cut off access to credit.” 
  





  Financial globalization, in theory, can bring capital, knowledge, and discipline to a 
country, and therefore improve efficiency and productivity. The empirical literature, however, 
does not produce clear-cut results. This has generated a large body of work which has been 
reviewed and summarized in several survey articles (see Stulz, 2005; Henry, 2007; Kose, 
Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2003 and 2009; and Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). One channel 
through which exposure to financial globalization may carry a downside is increased 
vulnerability to a financial crisis. This is thought to be especially relevant if the composition 
of capital inflows is skewed toward non-FDI types such as bank lending and portfolio flows 
(Wei, 2001 and 2006; Levchenko and Mauro, 2007) since international bank lending, and to 
some smaller extent portfolio flows, are more likely to be reversed than FDI.  
While the crises discussed in previous empirical literature tend to be those associated 
with foreign currency debt or balance of payments problems, the global crisis of 2008-2009 
offers a chance to check if the severity of an emerging market economy’s credit crunch is 
systematically linked to the volume and the composition of its pre-crisis international capital 
inflows, since the crisis may have triggered a reversal of global capital flows. Non-financial 
firms may suffer from a liquidity crunch that is linked to a capital flow reversal even if they 
do not borrow directly from foreign banks. The liquidity of a domestic banking sector is 
partially supported by domestic banks’ borrowing from foreign banks. In principle, when 
foreign lending retrenches, as it is prone to do in a global crisis, domestic banks may be 
forced to cut down lending to domestic non-financial firms. This creates a channel for the 
liquidity crunch experienced by non-financial firms in a country to be linked to the country’s 
prior exposure to foreign lending. In comparison, if FDI flows are less cyclical, then a 
liquidity crunch in a host country should be less linked to its FDI exposure. Foreign portfolio 
flows are likely to be in between FDI and bank lending in terms of reversibility during a    3  
 
crisis. These possibilities have important economic and policy implications, and should 
therefore be subject to a thorough empirical testing. The 2007-2009 crisis started off in 
August 2007 in the United States as a subprime mortgage crisis but quickly morphed into a 
global financial crisis in which financial institutions teetered on the edge of bankruptcy in 
many countries. A global economic crisis ensued in which non-financial firms around the 
world appeared to spiral downward as well. Part of the reason is a contraction of demand for 
the output of these firms. Another key potential contributor to the plight of the non-financial 
firms was the financial crisis itself, in the form of a negative shock to the supply of external 
finance available to non-financial firms. That is, non-financial firms did not do well, simply 
because they found themselves being cut off from the supply of working capital, even if they 
still had unfulfilled orders for their product.  
However, it is far from self-evident that non-financial firms suffered from a liquidity 
crunch. As Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2007) carefully document, non-financial firms held an 
abundance of cash prior to the crisis. According to them, “the net debt ratio (debt minus cash, 
divided by assets) exhibits a sharp secular decrease and most of this decrease in net debt is 
explained by an increase in cash holdings. The fall in net debt is so dramatic that the average 
net debt for US firms was negative in 2004. In other words, on average, firms could have 
paid off their entire debt[s] with their cash holdings.” Given the apparent secular upward 
trend in cash holdings, the net debt ratio was likely even further into negative territory by 
mid-2007, right before the start of the full-blown economic crisis. This at least suggests the 
possibility of no serious liquidity tightening outside the financial sector. Probably out of this 
belief, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke called strong corporate balance sheets “a 
bright spot in the darkening forecast” during his testimony to the U.S. Congress regarding 
monetary policy on February 27, 2008. While there may have been increasing recognition 
over time of a credit supply shock to non-financial firms, this is still by no means a consensus 
view. For example, in a paper dated October 2008, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) 
rejected the idea of a sharp decline in either bank lending to non-financial firms or 
commercial paper issuance by non-financial firms during the financial crisis. 
This paper has two objectives. First, we assess whether manufacturing firms in 
emerging economies experienced a liquidity crunch (beyond falling demand). Second, we 
examine if the pre-crisis volume and composition of capital inflows systematically affect the 
severity of the credit crunch across countries. We use data on 3823 manufacturing firms in 24    4  
 
countries, and explore cross-firm as well as cross-country variations in stock price responses 
to the crisis. The basic idea is this: changes in aggregate economic indicators and aggregate 
stock prices potentially reflect a multitude of factors, making it difficult to identify the 
severity of a credit crunch. However, if a credit crunch exists, it should be reflected in the 
relative stock price movement of those manufacturing firms that rely disproportionately on 
external finance for investment and working capital, versus those firms that don’t.  
We construct a measure of intrinsic dependency on external finance for long-term 
investment (DEF_INV) and another measure of intrinsic dependency on external finance for 
working capital (DEF_WK). The DEF_INV variable is based on Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
except that we compute the measure using data for a more recent period during 1990-2006 
and for each 3-digit SIC sector as opposed to their use of 2-digit sectors. Thus, we have 253 
sectors as opposed to their 36 sectors. Our measure of DEF_WK is modified from Raddatz 
(2006) by using data from the recent period of 1990 to 2006 as well. Our key regressors, 
DEF_INV and DEF_WK, are statistically significant with a correct sign in most regressions. 
We base the choice of our control variables on the Fama-French (1992) three-factor 
model, including beta, firm size, and book/market ratio, and, in some specifications, also 
including a measure of momentum suggested by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). 
These factors are often but not always statistically significant. These control variables reduce 
the magnitude of DEF_INV but have little impact on DEF_WK.  Our interpretation is that 
during the financial crisis period, our two variables of external finance dependence 
(particularly DEF_WK) may reflect aspects of firm risk that are not completely captured by 
the three-factor or the four-factor model.  
We make sure that our key regressors are pre-determined with respect to the full-
fledged financial crisis. In other words, our thought experiment is this: if we classify 
manufacturing firms into different baskets, based on their ex ante sensitivity to shocks to 
external finance (in terms of investment and working capital needs), will this classification 
help us to forecast the ex post stock price performance of these firms? If there is forecasting 
ability associated with these classifiers, would it carry over beyond what can be explained by 
the Fama-French three factors and the momentum factor? To preview the main results, we 
find clear evidence of a worsening credit crunch in emerging market economies in 2008. 
Relative to those firms whose intrinsic dependence on external finance for working capital 
(DEF_WK) is at the bottom quartile, those firms whose DEF_WK is at the top quartile    5  
 
experienced a greater decline in their stock prices by at least nine percentage points during 
the same period. While the average effects are statistically significant, they are not 
quantitatively overwhelming when compared to the extent of the total fall in stock prices 
(more than half). 
This paves the way for the central part of the paper: the role of country-level exposure 
to financial globalization in the transmission of the supply-of-finance shock. We zoom in on 
pre-crisis exposure to international capital flows in particular, and interact it with firms’ 
sensitivity to external finance. We find that the total volume of pre-crisis capital inflows is 
not systematically related to the severity of credit crunch, but the composition of the capital 
inflows matters in an important way. In particular, a large pre-crisis exposure to non-FDI 
capital inflows tends to be associated with a more severe credit crunch during the crisis, but 
pre-crisis exposure to FDI does not worsen a credit crunch. This provides fresh evidence for 
the idea in the literature that different types of capital flows bring different benefits and costs 
to recipient countries. 
  This paper is linked to two sets of literature. The first is on credit crunches (for 
example, Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Borensztein and Lee, 2002; Kroszner, Laeven, and 
Klingebiel, 2007; Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008; Claessens, Kose, and Terrones, 
2008). A small but growing literature has investigated the origin and consequences of the 
current financial crisis, including work by Mian and Sufi, (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff, 
(2008), Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, (2008), Greenlaw et al, (2008), Almeida et al (2009), 
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Mehl, (2009), and Eichengreen et al (2009). None of these papers 
examines the role of the composition of capital flows in the transmission of a financial crisis 
across countries.  
The second literature to which this paper is related studies the benefits and costs of 
financial globalization. A subset of the literature investigates possibly different effects of the 
composition of capital flows for economic growth or vulnerability to balance of payments 
crises. The views diverge. On the one hand, some regard FDI as more stable and thus less 
likely to trigger financial crisis than portfolio financial flows and bank loans (e.g. Berg, 
Borenzstein, and Pattillo, 2004). On the other hand, others doubt the relative destabilizing 
properties of bank lending and portfolio flows (e.g. Claessens, Dooley and Warner, 1995). In 
a more recent paper, Levchenko and Mauro (2007) find mixed evidence: while FDI is less 
volatile than other types of capital flows as measured by coefficient of variation, different    6  
 
types of capital flows do not seem to differ significantly in persistence, pro-cyclicality, and 
responsiveness to U.S. interest rates. For emerging market economies, the current global 
crisis is different from a usual balance-of-payments crisis or a home-grown financial crisis, 
which were the subjects of virtually all previous papers on financial crisis. Thus, while none 
of the previous papers studies if and how the extent of a liquidity crunch experienced by non-
financial firms across countries is linked to a country’s pattern of capital flows, the current 
crisis provides an opportunity to do so. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our key specification, construction 
of key variables, and sources of data. Section 3 discusses the main empirical results and a 
slew of robustness checks and extensions. Section 4 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Specification and Key Variables 
 
2.1 Basic specification 
  Our basic empirical strategy is to check whether an ex ante classification of firms by 
their characteristics in terms of degree of liquidity constraint helps to predict the ex post 
magnitude of their stock price changes from the start of the global crisis (taken as July 31, 
2007) to Dec 31, 2008. To be precise, our specification is given by the following equation: 
 
(1) StockReturn i,k,j = country fixed effects + β*FinancialDependence k + Controli,k,j + ε i,k,j 
 
where i stands for company, k for sector, and j for country. Note that this is a purely cross-
sectional regression, and the key regressors are pre-determined (in 2006). We start by 
assuming the same βj for all countries in order to estimate an average effect, but will allow 
for variations across countries later. 
Asset pricing models provide guidance for control variables. We add the three factors 
from Fama and French (1992): firm size (log assets), the ratio of the market value to book 
value, and the beta (the correlation between the firm stock return and the market return). We 
further control for sector-level intrinsic sensitivity to a demand contraction as in Tong and 
Wei (2008). In some specifications, we also add a fourth control variable: a momentum 
factor from Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishy (1994). We follow Whited and Wu (2006) and 
incorporate the four factors by entering the relevant firm characteristics directly in our    7  
 
regressions rather than entering them indirectly by first going through a factor model. For 
control variables, these two ways of incorporating the four factors should be equivalent. 
Entering firm characteristics directly in our regressions is easier to implement, though the 
interpretation of the coefficients on these factors is less straightforward. 
To see how a pattern of pre-crisis exposure to capital flows affects the extent of a 
liquidity crunch, we now consider the interaction between a country’s pattern of financial 
integration and its manufacturing firms’ dependence on external finance. In other words,  
 
(2)  βj = β 1 + β 2 Pattern_of_Capital_Flow j 
 
where the Pattern_of_Capital_Flow experienced in country j is measured by either the total 
volume of pre-crisis capital inflows, or the composition of capital inflows (FDI v. non-FDI). 
The slope coefficient, β2, then captures the degree to which the extent of a credit crunch 
depends on patterns of capital inflows.  
 
2.2 Key Data 
Percentage change in stock price 
The stock price index is retrieved from Datastream, which adjusts for dividends and 
capital actions such as stock splits and reverse splits. Table 1 presents the log difference of 
stock price for manufacturing firms from the 24 emerging countries and 20 developed 
economies over the period from the end of July 2007 to the end of December 2008. 
(Manufacturing sectors are those with U.S. SIC 3-digit codes ranging between 200 and 399).  
Among emerging economies (the focus of this paper), the log difference of stock price index 
was 81.8% on average, with a standard deviation as large as 66.7%. It shows significant 
variation both across sectors within a country and across countries, with Poland and Russia 
experiencing the largest decline in stock prices and Mexico and Thailand the smallest.  
 
Financial dependence indices  
  We develop two measures of intrinsic dependence for external finance: 
•  Intrinsic dependence on external finance for investment (DEF_INV)    8  
 
We construct a sector-level approximation of a firm’s intrinsic demand on external 
finance for capital investment following a methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998): 
(4) 
capital expenditures - cash flow
Dependence on external finance for investment =  ,
capital expenditures
 
where Cash flow = cash flow from operations + decreases in inventories + decreases in 
receivables + increases in payables. All the numbers are based on U.S. firms, which are 
judged to be least likely to suffer from financing constraints (during a normal time) relative 
to firms in other countries. While the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) paper covers only 
40 (mainly SIC 2-digit) sectors, we expand the coverage to around 250 SIC 3-digit sectors.   
To calculate the demand for external financing of US firms, we take the following 
steps. First, every firm in the COMPUSTA USA is sorted into one of the SIC 3-digit sectors. 
Second, we calculate the ratio of dependence on external finance for each firm from 1990-
2006. Third, we calculate the sector-level median from firm ratios for each SIC 3-digit sector 
that contains at least 5 firms, and the median value is then chosen, to be the index of demand 
for external financing in that sector. Conceptually, the Rajan-Zingales (RZ) index aims to 
identify sector-level features, i.e. which sectors are naturally more dependent on external 
financing for their business operation. It ignores the question of which firms within a sector 
are more liquidity constrained. What the RZ index measures could be regarded as a 
“technical feature” of a sector, almost like a part of the production function.  To capture the 
economic concept of the percentage of capital expenditure that has to be financed by external 
funding, we winsorize the RZ index to range between 0 and 1. 
 
•  Intrinsic dependence on external finance for working capital (DEF_WK) 
  Besides capital need for investment, working capital is required for a firm to operate 
and to satisfy both short-term debt payment and ongoing operational expenses. Firms may 
use lines of credit, term loans or commercial paper to cover such needs. If a liquidity crunch 
makes it difficult for a firm to raise funds for working capital distinct from external financing 
for long-term investment, we would like to capture that. If there is an unexpected liquidity 
crunch for working capital, those industries that depend intrinsically more on external 
finance for working capital should experience a larger decline of stock prices.     9  
 
We construct a sector-level measure of intrinsic need for external finance for working 
capital by the concept of a “cash conversion cycle”, which has also been adopted by Raddatz 
(2006) and Kroszner, Laeven, Klingebiel, (2007). The cycle measures the time elapsed from 
the moment a firm pays for its inputs to the moment it receives payment for the goods it sells. 
We assume that dependence on external finance for working capital is due to pure 
technological reasons, such as the length of time in the production process and the mode of 
operation. For U.S. firms during a non-crisis period, when the supply of finance is as 
abundant as in any country, the relative values of the cash conversion cycle across sectors 
reflect relative true needs for external finance for working capital. Specifically,
1  
inventories - account payables account receivables
Cash conversion cycle= 365*





The sector-level proxy is constructed as follows: First, for each U.S. firm from 1990 
to 2006, we calculate the cash conversion cycle based on annual data from Compustat USA 
Industrial Annual. Then we calculate the median within each U.S. SIC 3-digit sector, and 
apply it as the sector’s intrinsic dependence on external finance for working capital. The 
index for the U.S. firms is then extrapolated to other countries. As in Raddatz (2006), we rely 
on U.S. firm data in that the supply of liquid funds is much more elastic in the US, and hence 
observed differences in relative working capital levels across industries are mainly demand 
driven. The median and mean values of this index are both 71 days, and the standard 
deviation is 41 days. 
 
Control Variables and Summary Statistics  
In some subsequent analyses, we add other variables meant to control for risks, such 
as the three factors from the Fama-French (1992) model, which are firm size (as measured by 
the log of book assets), market asset to book asset ratio, and beta from the datasets of 
Worldscope and Datastream. The firm-level market beta is based on the correlation between 
monthly firm stock price and the country-level market index over the past five years. We also 
                                                 
1 Inventories, accounts receivable, and accounts payable are year-end numbers, while costs of goods and sales 
are aggregated over the year. Hence we follow the literature and multiply the ratio by 365, i.e., the number of 
days in a year.     10  
 
include a measure of the momentum factor: that is, the stock return for the firm from January 
31, 2007 to June 30, 2007.  
In our model, we use the domestic beta. Griffin (2002) finds that domestic factor 
models explain much more time-series variation in returns and have lower pricing errors than 
the world factor model. Moreover, the addition of foreign factors to domestic models leads to 
less accurate in-sample and out-of-sample pricing. Hence, “practical applications of the 
three-factor model… are best performed on a country-specific basis”.    
Another regressor is an index of a firm’s sensitivity to a contraction in consumer 
demand. Tong and Wei (2008) propose such an index at the sector level based on the stock 
price reactions of the firms in that sector to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. To 
construct the index, we first compute the change in log stock price for each US firm from 
September 10, 2001 to September 28, 2001. We then look at the mean of log stock price 
change for each three-digit SIC sector, and use it as the sector-level demand sensitivity. 
Excluding financial sector firms, we are left with 361 3-digit level sectors in total. 
This index reflects the sensitivity of a firm’s stock price to an unexpected shock in 
consumer demand, and it is not contaminated by a firm’s sensitivity to liquidity shocks or 
other factors. We verify that there was a big downward shift in expected aggregated demand, 
as reflected by a downward adjustment in the consensus forecast of subsequent U.S. GDP 
growth in the aftermath of the shock at the same time, because the Federal Reserve took 
timely and decisive actions, it may be argued that the effect of the 9/11 shock on firms’ 
financial constraints was small or at most short lived.  In the 2001 episode, both the level of 
the real interest rate and the TED spread (risk premium), after initial spikes, quickly returned 
to a level only moderately higher than the pre-9/11 level. This suggests that the market 
regarded the Federal Reserve’s actions in the first few days following the terrorist attack as 
sufficient to restore the market’s desired level of liquidity. We therefore conclude that the 
cumulative stock price change from September 10 to 28, 2001, is unlikely to also reflect 
firms’ reactions to a deterioration of credit availability. (In contrast, the subprime crisis news 
is associated with a much greater increase in the TED spread.) Additional details can be 
found in Tong and Wei (2008). 
Table 2a reports summary statistics of the key variables. Table 2b reports pair-wise 
correlations among the variables.  
    11  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 The extent of financial constraint  
We examine percentage change in stock price (or more precisely, difference in the log 
of stock price) from July 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008 for manufacturing firms in 24 
emerging countries. In Column 1 of Table 3, we have the dependence on external finance for 
investment (DEF_INV) as the only regressor. Here, it has a negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficient.  In Column 2, we use the dependence on external finance for 
working capital (DEF_WK) as the only regressor. The coefficient is also negative, and 
significant at the 5% level. In Columns 3, we put DEF_INV and DEF_WK together in the 
regression, and find that DEF_WK maintains its earlier magnitude and sign. This is not 
surprising, as the correlation between the two indexes is low (only 0.04). That is, they appear 
to capture different needs for external finance.  
Columns 1 to 3 show that the fall in stock price is statistically larger for sectors with 
higher dependence on external finance for working capital. What about the economic 
significance?  An increase in the dependence for external finance for working capital 
(DEF_WK) from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile (i.e., from 35 to 95 days) leads an extra 
decline in the stock price to by 9.3 percentage points.  This is economically important.   
The difference in the significance levels between DEF_WK and DEF_INV can be 
interpreted in two ways. First, it is possible that DEF_WK is a better measure of a firm’s 
intrinsic dependence on external finance than DEF_INV. Indeed, Fisman and Love (2007) 
suggest that DEF_INV may capture sector-specific shocks, though it is less likely to be case 
here since DEF_INV is pre-determined (measured with pre-crisis data and based on US 
firms’ actual use of external finance). Second, to the extent that the two measures capture 
different aspects of a firm’s dependence on external finance, the statistical results suggest 
that the contraction of credit supply and widespread concern among financial institutions 
about counterparty risk have inflicted disproportionate pain on those firms that are heavily 
dependent on external finance for working capital. 
In Column 4, we add beta as a control variable. The coefficient on the “beta*market 
return” variable is positive and significant. This is intuitive as it says that firms with a smaller 
beta experience a smaller reduction in stock price during the market downturn, other things 
being equal. We also add, as controls, firm size and market-to-book ratio from the Fama-   12  
 
French model, as well as the momentum factor (stock return from January 31 to June 30, 
2007). The firm size variable is positive, as firms with large size may have better access to 
credit in times of crisis. Firms with a high market-to-book ratio experience a greater decline 
in price. Adding these factors slightly reduces the magnitude of DEF_WK, suggesting that 
part of the financial constraint on DEF_WK is correlated with firm-level risk factors as 
described by the Fama-French model.  
   In Column 5, we control for a sector’s intrinsic sensitivity to aggregate demand. This 
is significantly negative, verifying that a demand contraction is one reason for the 
deteriorating performance of manufacturing firms. In Column 6, we further control for firms’ 
pre-crisis leverage. We find that leveraged firms suffered greater stock price declines during 
this crisis, probably due to the difficulty of rolling over debt in an environment of tight 
financial supply. In the last two columns, we continue to find a significant effect of 
DEF_WK but not of DEF_INV. 
  Since a global recession could affect a firm’s earnings direct through the international 
channel, we further examine if the firm-level sensitivity to trade plays a significant role 
during the current crisis.   We use a two-step procedure, to  construct a measure of the 
sensitivity to trade. First, a firm's annual stock return is regressed onto a constant and 
the  annual percentage change of its 3-digit SIC sector exports from its country  over the 
period from 1992 to 2006. Second, the coefficient on the exports  is then used to proxy the 
trade sensitivity of the firm.  By adding this variable to the regressions in Table 3, the sample 
size shrinks by around 4.5%. In any case, the trade-sensitivity index does not turn out to be 
statistically significant (with a coefficient of 0.05 and a standard error of 1.76). When we 
reclassify the negative values of the trade sensitivity as zeros to reduce potential noises in the 
proxy,   we obtain a negative but still insignificant coefficient (see the last column of Table 
3). Importantly, adding trade sensitivity does not alter the earlier results for DEF_WK. 
 
3.2 The role of pre-crisis exposure to international finance   
  So far we have documented the existence of a worsening financial constraint, on 
average, across countries. We now turn to the central part of the analysis by examining 
whether the cross-country variation in the severity of a credit crunch is related to a country’s 
pre-crisis exposure to international capital flows.     13  
 
International capital flows increased rapidly from 2002, peaking in 2007. Since 2008, 
however, world capital inflows have declined sharply, by 44% in absolute dollar amount 
relative to the peak in 2007. As a result, emerging markets have experienced a “systemic 
sudden stop”, a capital account reversal with a systemic and largely exogenous origin, as 
defined by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2008).  
Capital flow reversals could bring catastrophic economic results. For example, they 
could disrupt liquidity supply available to firms and raise the foreign debt burden of firms 
due to currency depreciation. In the previous literature, there was some weak evidence that 
the output loss incurred by a capital flow reversal is more severe for emerging markets that 
are more integrated with the global financial market (see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 
2009).  Most such evidence is based on country level data. In this paper, we combine firm-
level financial data with country-level capital flows to study whether and how a capital flow 
reversal affects firms’ access to external finance.   
To measure a country’s pre-crisis exposure to foreign capital, we adopt a de facto 
measure: the country’s annual inflow of capital over GDP averaged from 2002 to 2006. (We 
will use an alternative measure based on actual policy restrictions in a robustness check). 
Table 4 presents the pre-crisis exposure. We can see that emerging markets on average enjoy 
a significant inflow of capital from 2002 to 2006, although this is still smaller than in a 
typical developed country.  
We multiply the volume of capital inflow by the two indexes of financial constraints 
(DEF_INV and DEF_WK), respectively, and add these interaction terms to the econometric 
model. We separate emerging markets from developed countries, as the literature has 
documented an asymmetric effect of financial integration on these two groups of countries 
(Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2009). We focus on emerging markets in our baseline case.  
  Table 5 examines the volume effect of pre-crisis capital flows. The dependent 
variable is stock returns from July 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008. The sample consists of 
listed manufacturing companies in 24 emerging markets. In Column 1 of Table 5, we include 
the interactions between the volume of capital inflows and the two measures of financial 
dependence, respectively. Neither interaction term is significant. On average, the extent of 
the liquidity crunch does not appear to be linked to a country’s pre-crisis volume of capital 
inflows. In Column 2, we control for firm level factors; and in Column 3, we add sector fixed 
effects. In these two specifications, the volume of capital flow multiplied by DEF_INV is not    14  
 
significant, while capital flow multiplied by DEF_WK is significant at the 10% level. Hence 
there are some indications that the volume of pre-crisis capital flows may have affected the 
degree of a liquidity crunch during the 2007-08 crisis, but the evidence is not overwhelming.  
However, it may be misleading to conclude that a country’s exposure to financial 
globalization does not matter. The literature suggests that the composition of capital flows 
matters in currency and balance of payments crises (Wei, 2001 and 2006, and Kim and Wei, 
2002). For example, it has been pointed out that the volume of international bank lending 
(scaled by a recipient country’s GDP) is generally more volatile than international direct 
investment as measured either by standard deviation or coefficient of variation. The 
theoretical model of Goldstein and Razin (2006) also predicts that projects financed by FDI 
are less reversible because they are more difficult to be liquidated than projects financed by 
other types of international capital. The 2007-2009 crisis provides a fresh opportunity to 
examine the connection between a liquidity crunch and the composition capital flows. Hence 
we separate capital inflows into three components: foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign 
portfolio investment (FPI), and foreign loans (FL). This breakdown follows the definition in 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics dataset.  
Figure 1 traces the different components of international capital inflows from 1999 to 
2009 for the 24 emerging economies in our sample, with the data collected from the IMF’s 
World Economic Outlook database. While all three components rose in the years leading up 
to the crisis and exhibited a reversal during the crisis, there are still visible differences among 
them. In particular, both the rise and the fall are the sharpest for international bank loans. In 
contrast, international direct investment (FDI) is comparatively stable. While the pre-crisis 
rise of FDI was more gradual than international bank loans, the reversal by FDI started only 
in 2008 and has been relatively mild. Does this translate into differential capital reversal at 
the country level? Figure 2 plots the reversal of total capital inflows from 2007 to 2009 at the 
country level against the initial share of FDI in total capital inflows (in 2007).  Indeed, a 
higher pre-crisis FDI share in capital inflow is associated with a smaller magnitude of capital 
reversal during the crisis. Because the number of countries is small, the slope coefficient 
(2.64) is statistically significant at the 15% level. Of course, this is only suggestive evidence 
that the composition of capital inflows may matter for a country’s fortune during a crisis. 
We now examine formally whether the degree of financial constraint during the 2007-
09 crisis is related to the components of pre-crisis capital flows.  Each component is    15  
 
multiplied by our two financial dependence indicators for long-term investment (DEF_INV) 
and short-term working capital (DEF_WK), respectively. The results are in Table 6. In 
Column 1, the multiplication of DEF_INV with FPI is significantly negative. That is, firms 
with needs for external finance for long-term investment suffer more from a liquidity crunch 
in countries with a large exposure to FPI. Meanwhile, foreign loans generate a negative 
coefficient and FDI generates a positive coefficient, although statistically insignificant in 
both cases. In Column 2, we add DEF_WK and the interaction terms. We find similar sign 
patterns. While FDI has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5% level, both FPI and 
foreign loans have negative coefficients. These are significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
foreign loans variable generates a coefficient more than twice that on FPI, consistent with the 
story that international loans are reversed (not renewed) more quickly in a crisis, which 
triggers domestic banks to cut down their loans to firms even for working capital needs. In 
addition, even though the interaction term between FDI and DEF_WK is significantly 
positive, if we multiply each flow component by its coefficient in Column 2, and sum them 
up together with the coefficient on DEF_WK itself (i.e., –0.153), we would still back out the 
earlier results in Column 2 of Table 3 that a higher DEF_WK is on average associated a 
greater decline in stock prices.  
In Column 3 of Table 6, we add sector fixed effects to control for potentially omitted 
sector-level variables that are correlated with financial dependence indexes. This drops 
financial dependence indices and the demand sensitivity index from the regression as they 
are part of the sector specific fixed effects. But the interaction terms between financial 
dependence and capital flow components are preserved. This addition generally shows a 
sharpened asymmetric impact of different capital flow components on the severity of a 
financial shock.  
In Column 4, we add firm-level controls and find similar results. Besides the three 
Fama-French factors, other firm-level factors may affect the stock price movement. For 
example, firms with a higher pre-crisis leverage ratio may have more difficulty in rolling 
over their debt during a crisis.  In addition, a higher leverage ratio may by itself trigger a 
larger decline in stock price for a given demand shock. Hence we include the leverage ratio 
as a control variable in Column 5. It turns out that the coefficient on the leverage ratio is 
significantly negative, confirming that a higher leverage ratio by itself is associated with a 
larger decline in stock prices. When we interact it with capital flow components in Column 6,    16  
 
the interaction term with FDI has a positive coefficient, and those with foreign portfolio and 
foreign bank loans are negative. Interestingly, it does not affect the results for our financial 
constraint indicators (DEF_INV and DEF_WK).  
It is important to note that, for capital flows to affect a liquidity crunch, it is not 
necessary for manufacturing firms to borrow directly from international banks or to raise 
funds directly from the international capital market. In a study of the effect of capital controls 
on liquidity constraints in Chile, Forbes (2007) notes that borrowing by domestic banks from 
international banks and capital markets is enough to forge a connection between liquidity 
constraints on domestic manufacturing firms and a country’s exposure to international capital 
flows. In particular, firm-level financial constraints could be affected by the global financial 
market, “whether the small firms received capital inflows directly, or whether they borrowed 
from banks (which experienced a lengthening of their maturities and attempted to match the 
maturities of their assets and liabilities).” In Figure 3, we plot the extent of the decline in 
banking stock prices in a country during the crisis against the country’s pre-crisis volume of 
borrowing from international banks. The two are clearly related. Banks fare less well during 
the crisis in a country that relied relatively more on international bank loans before the crisis. 
Korea also offers another demonstration of an indirect but significant linkage between 
domestic firms and international financial markets. Before the crisis, Korean banks had 
developed a reliance on wholesale financing from the international capital market. Once the 
crisis hit, they suffered significantly when sources of foreign financing dried out. This 
induced them to cut down loans to domestic firms. According to an HSBC report on Sep 09, 
2008: “Korean banks' high reliance on wholesale funding is transmitting higher funding costs 
from global credit markets into the leveraged Korean economy.”
2 
  The effect of pre-crisis exposure to FDI on the financial constraint is worth noting. In 
normal times, having an internal capital market is considered a strength of multinational 
firms. This is shown by Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) and Desai, Foley and Forbes (2008). 
The relatively strong financial position by multinational firms can be used by these firms to 
alleviate financial constraint in the foreign subsidiaries that they invest in. In a time of 
financial crisis, this is more of an open question since multinational firms could be in 
                                                 
2 Mahendran, Devendran, (2008), “Korean banks: Increasing costs to the economy”, HSBC Report (September 
9, 2008). http://www.rgemonitor.com/457?cluster_id=2263    17  
 
financial difficulties themselves. Indeed, the news about the financial difficulties faced by the 
GM and Chrysler points to this possibility. On the other hand, since many manufacturing 
firms in the U.S. had a high level of cash reserves just before the crisis (according to Bates, 
Kahle, and Stulz, 2007), those firms that engage in FDI, which tend to be larger than average, 
may still be in a better position to weather a financial shock than other firms, especially than 
firms in developing countries. The evidence in the current paper suggests that the internal 
capital market of multinational firms may very well be tapped in places where foreign 
subsidiaries experience financial difficulties and could not obtain financing from the host 
country financial system.  
  The estimated effect of pre-crisis exposure to foreign portfolio inflows on the 
financial constraint is also sensible. The withdrawal of international portfolio capital makes it 
more costly for firms to roll over their debt. For firms that wish to use seasonal stock 
offerings to raise new capital, the cost of capital also increases when less international capital 
is available to support the market. In either case, when international portfolio flows retreat, 
the extent of financial constraint experienced by firms in the recipient countries tightens. 
 
 3.3 Robustness tests and extensions  
  We have included country fixed effects to control for the impacts of country-level 
variables on average stock prices. We now examine whether some other country level 
variables, besides capital flows, may also affect stock prices through the channel of firm 
financial dependence. One prominent suspect is the degree of domestic financial 
development (see Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007). As a robustness check, we interact 
the country’s level of domestic financial development with the sector’s finance dependence. 
We measure domestic financial development  by the ratio of private credit over GDP at the 
end of 2006. (The correlation between financial development and the average capital inflow 
is 0.54 in our sample of emerging economies.) The interaction between a country’s domestic 
financial development and sector-level financial dependence is not significant for either 
DEF_INV or DEF_WK (see Column 1 of Table 7). Moreover, adding domestic financial 
development does not alter the results for capital flows.  In Column 2 of Table 7, we 
experiment with a second proxy of domestic financial development: the sum of private credit 
and stock market capitalization over DP at the end of 2006. Again, this does not change our 
key results regarding the role of capital flows.    18  
 
In all regressions, we measure pre-crisis capital inflows over the period 2002-2006. 
As robustness checks, we test two variations of this measure. First, we extend the pre-crisis 
window to include 2007. In this case, the results become stronger (Column 3 of Table 7). The 
multiplication of DEF_INV with FDI is positive and significant at the 1%, with a larger 
magnitude than the counterpart in Table 6. FPI is still significantly negative at the 1% level, 
while foreign loan moves from insignificantly negative in Table 6 to significantly negative at 
the 5% level. Hence, by using a slightly longer window, the contrast between FDI and non-
FDI flows on financial constraints becomes more pronounced.  
 
3.4 A de jure measure of exposure to financial globalization 
So far, we measure exposure to financial globalization by a country’s de facto, or 
realized, capital flows. The realized volume of capital flows may not reflect government 
policies. As an extension, we use a de jure measure based on a country’s actual policies as 
recorded in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). A country’s policies on cross-border capital flows are classified by the IMF into 
about 100 categories, covering FDI, portfolio flows, bank lending, and others. We use the 
policies in 2006 to construct three separate indicators of de jure openness for inward FDI, 
inward FPI (purchase of local shares and bonds by nonresidents), and foreign loans 
(commercial and financial credit from nonresidents to residents), respectively. The de jure 
indicators are listed in Appendix Table 1. The de jure classification and the de facto 
classification (based on realized inflows) are positively correlated but far from perfectly, with 
correlation coefficients of 0.38, 0.25 and 0.37, respectively, for direct investment, portfolio 
investment and foreign loans. This means that the de jure index can potentially provide an 
informative and independent check on the connection between the composition of capital 
flows and a liquidity crunch. The regression results are in the last column of Table 7. For 
DEF_INV, we find that pre-crisis FDI openness significantly alleviates financial constraint 
during this crisis; for DEF_WK, pre-crisis openness to FPI significantly worsens the 
financial constraint during the crisis. Between the de facto and the de jure measures, we put 
more weight on the de facto measure as different types of policy restrictions may not have 
the same intensity but de facto measures automatically assign more weight to more important 
policy restrictions (see Kose et al, 2003 for a discussion on de facto versus de jure measures).   
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3.5 Contemporaneous betas and other robustness checks  
We have used pre-crisis beta based on monthly stock returns from 2002 to 2006. The 
advantage of constructing the beta measure based on the recent past is that the regressor is 
then pre-determined. A potential disadvantage is that it may miss some time-varying aspect 
of the risk. As a robustness check, we construct a contemporaneous measure using a market 
model and weekly stock return data during July 31, 2007-December 31, 2008. We then 
multiply the contemporaneous beta by the local market return during this period as a control 
variable in our model. We first check if it affects the average liquidity crunch across 
countries (Column 1 of Table 8).  The beta variable has a significant coefficient close to 0.93 
with a t-stat of 11.42. This is not surprising given how the beta is calculated. It is important 
to note that the new measure does not alter our earlier results. In particular, DEF_WK still 
has a significant coefficient of -0.12. In Column 2 of Table 8, we find that the new measure 
does not alter the results on the composition of capital flows, either. In particular, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms between DEF_WK and pre-crisis portfolio inflows, and 
between DEF_WK and pre-crisis foreign loan, are still negative and statistically significant.    
In Columns 3-4 of Table 8, we define the left-hand-side variable as  
[logPk, dec08 – log Pk, july07] / (½)[logPk, dec08 + log Pk, july07]. This leads to no change in the 
qualitative patterns reported earlier.  
The regressions so far assign equal weights to all firms, but different countries have a 
different number of stocks. As a robustness check, we use a weighted least squares regression 
specification, with the weights proportional to the inverse of the square root of the number of 
manufacturing stocks in a country (Column 5 of Table 8). This does not change the pattern 
that the coefficients on the interaction terms between DEF_WK and pre-crisis portfolio 
inflows, and between DEF_WK and pre-crisis foreign loan, are negative and significant. 
As some countries in our sample have very few manufacturing stocks, e.g. 5 for 
Czech Republic, and 8 for Colombia, it is difficult to generate enough variations in financial 
dependence across firms for them. As another check, we limit the sample to countries with at 
least 25 manufacturing stocks (resulting in 19 countries) and re-run the weighted least 
squares estimation. The results are in Column 6 of Table 8. Again, all the interaction terms 
involving FDI have positive coefficients while all those involving non-FDI components have 
negative coefficients. Of those coefficients, the interaction between FDI and DEF_INV and 
that between FPI (or foreign loans) and DEF_WK are statistically significant.    20  
 
We have been focusing our sample on manufacturing firms thus far. We now expand 
the sample to all non-financial firms as a robustness check. While this change results in a 
50% expansion of the regression sample, the sign patterns of the coefficients are the same, 
although the significance levels are generally weak. The weakening of the significance level 
could indicate that intrinsic dependence on external finance for working capital (DEF_WK) 
is more readily measured for manufacturing firms than for other non-financial firms. 
As another extension, we investigate the possibility that capital flows affect stock 
prices through aggregate demand. Hence, we include an interaction of demand sensitivity 
with capital flows. We use two proxies of demand sensitivity: i) a sector’s pro-cyclicality 
from the FTSE/JSE Global Classification System; ii) a sector-level demand sensitivity index 
from Tong and Wei (2008). The FTSE system classifies sectors into resources, basic 
industries, general industrials, cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical consumer goods, 
cyclical services, non-cyclical services, utilities, financials, and information technology. We 
construct a dummy which equals one if a manufacturing firm belongs to cyclical consumer 
goods or services, and then interact the dummy with capital flows. In the specification with 
sector and country fixed effects, the pro-cyclicality dummy interacted with FDI inflow 
renders a significantly positive coefficient, while its interactions with FPI and loans render an 
insignificantly negative coefficient. More importantly, the results on financial constraint 
indicators (DEF_INV and DEF_WP) are not affected. Alternatively, when we apply the 
demand sensitivity index from Tong and Wei (2008), its multiplications with capital flow 
components do not turn out to be significant. Again, the results on financial constraint 
indicators are not affected (results not reported to save space).   
Finally, as Fisman and Love (2007) suggest, the Rajan-Zingales index of external 
financial dependence may partly reflect cross-sector differences in global growth 
opportunities. To reduce potential measurement bias in DEF_INV, we control for shocks to 
global opportunity directly over the period from 1990 to 2006, which is the sample period we 
use to construct DEF_INV. Following Fisman and Love (2007), we first calculate the real 
annual growth rate for each US firm in the COMPUSTA dataset, then take the US SIC 3-
digit-sector median of the firm-level growth rates as the USGrowth. The correlation between 
USGrowth and the Rajan-Zingales index is around 0.30 for 120 manufacturing sectors. We 
then Winsorize USGrowth at the 1% level and interact it with capital flow components (FDI, 
FPI and foreign loans).  It turns out the growth opportunity variable and its interactions with    21  
 
capital flow components are not significant (with p-values larger than 0.4). Most important, 
they do not affect the earlier results on the interactions involving DEF_INV. That is, a 
liquidity crunch experienced by firms is more serious for firms that depend on external 
finance for capital investment, especially in countries with a high exposure to foreign loans 
before the crisis (Results not reported to save space).   
 
3.6 A placebo test 
All the robustness tests above are designed to see if key results survive if we add 
variations to the basic specification or variable definitions. We now perform a placebo test by 
looking at a non-crisis period. In particular, we examine whether capital flows from 2002 to 
2005 affect stock prices from January 1
st 2006 to June 30, 2007. If the composition of capital 
flows generates vulnerability for the recipient country only in a time of crisis, then the 
patterns reported earlier would not be repeated in the placebo test. 
In Column 1 of Table 10, we examine the average effect of financial constraints. We 
do not find any significant effect for either DEF_INV or DEF_WK. (Similarly, we do not 
find a significant effect for demand sensitivity). In Column 2, we check for the effect of 
capital flow volume and do not find it to be significant. In Column 3, we examine the role of 
capital flow components by interacting flow components with DEF_INV and DEF_WK. The 
interaction of FDI and DEF_INV is significant at the 10% level, but none of the other five 
interaction terms is significant.  In Column 4, we include sector fixed effects, then 
FDI*DEF_INV becomes insignificant. The placebo test hence suggests that the key pattern 
in our baseline case is a feature of the crisis but not a general feature of the normal times. 
 
3.7 The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as  an event study   
  The collapse of Lehman Brothers with a government bailout on September 15, 2008, 
came as a surprise to many, but has been regarded as a watershed event (as least ex post) that 
may have aggravated the global financial panic and tightened global liquidity. This means 
that the Lehman collapse could serve as an event study allowing us to investigate the 
research questions of this paper from another angle.  
We check the relative movement in stock prices in the short period from the last 
trading day before the Lehman bankruptcy filing (Friday, September 12) to the day after the 
collapse (September 16) and pay special attention to any role played by the patterns in a    22  
 
country’s pre-crisis capital flows. We estimate the same model as before, except for the now 
much narrower time window. The results are presented in Table 11. In the last column with 
sector fixed effects and firm level controls, we find that the interaction of pre-crisis FDI with 
DEF_INV is significantly positive at the 1% level, while the interactions of pre-crisis non-
FDI flows with DEF_INV are negative. Moreover, the interactions of FPI and foreign loans 
with DEF_WK also generate significantly negative coefficients. These patterns confirm our 
earlier findings that FDI may alleviate the financial constraints, while pre-crisis reliance on 




In this paper, we propose a methodological framework to study the effect of capital 
flows on liquidity constraints in a recipient country and the role of the composition of pre-
crisis capital inflows in the liquidity crunch. To investigate the presence of liquidity 
constraint, we ask the question: if we classify manufacturing firms into different baskets, 
based on their ex ante sensitivity to shocks to external finance (in terms of investment and 
working capital needs), would this classification help us to forecast the ex post stock price 
performance of these firms? To investigate the role of capital inflows we embed both 
country-level capital flows, and their interactions with sector level dependence on external 
finance, into the regression framework.  
If we just include total volumes of capital inflows, we do not find a connection 
between a country’s exposure to capital flows and the extent of the liquidity crunch 
experienced by its manufacturing firms during 2007-09. However, this masks an important 
compositional effect. FDI and non-FDI flows have very different effects that may offset each 
other in the aggregate. When we disaggregate capital flows into three types (FDI, foreign 
portfolio flows, and foreign loans), a different but consistent pattern emerges. Liquidity 
shocks are more severe for emerging economies that have a higher pre-crisis exposure to 
foreign portfolio investments and foreign loans, but less severe for countries that have a 
higher pre-crisis exposure to foreign direct investments. This empirical pattern suggests that 
one should not lump different capital flows together when one wishes to understand the 
connection between capital flows and a liquidity crunch in a crisis.     23  
 
It is important to point out that the current paper is not meant to be a comprehensive 
assessment of the welfare effects of the composition of capital flows. To do that, one also 
needs to examine several additional pieces of information, including how different forms of 
capital flows affect liquidity constraints and growth rates during a tranquil time. This would 
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Table 1: Average Change of Stock Price(log)  
from 7/31/07 to 12/31/08 for Manufacturing Firms 
COUNTRY Obs  #  Median  Mean  Std  Dev  Min  Max 
ARGENTINA 28  -16.8  -31.6  56.0  -138.6  47.2 
BRAZIL 90  -51.9  -56.3  70.7  -307.6  80.2 
CHILE 47  -26.2  -28.2  49.0  -164.5  87.6 
CHINA 893  -89.2  -89.1  51.3  -361.5  209.5 
COLOMBIA 8  -16.5  -43.0  102.3  -268.9  67.3 
CZECH REPUBLIC  5  -9.5  -22.1  30.0  -66.9  2.6 
EGYPT 27  -36.4  -27.9  45.5  -99.9  107.3 
HONG KONG  322  -112.2  -122.7  76.1  -454.7  119.3 
HUNGARY 12  -84.9  -72.8  41.2  -124.6  0.1 
INDIA 516  -71.6  -73.5  57.5  -244.0  221.9 
INDONESIA 112  -39.9  -45.1  77.3  -321.6  225.8 
ISRAEL 61  -117.2  -120.6  100.8  -462.8  18.6 
KOREA (SOUTH)  624  -79.3  -89.5  77.1  -709.5  120.2 
MALAYSIA 418  -53.2  -64.0  64.3  -366.1  60.5 
MEXICO 38  -22.9  -34.4  62.9  -174.2  81.8 
PAKISTAN 66  -57.0  -60.5  70.2  -209.4  144.1 
PERU 19  -39.5  -39.8  61.4  -141.9  89.6 
PHILIPPINES 32  -61.4  -69.4  69.4  -213.9  31.2 
POLAND 84  -148.0  -147.2  77.8  -534.2  13.3 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  24  -143.7  -129.4  65.2  -216.5  18.8 
SINGAPORE 242  -110.3  -111.3  75.1  -352.8  152.4 
SOUTH AFRICA  57  -39.5  -47.6  62.1  -259.0  83.6 
THAILAND 214  -34.7  -42.9  54.2  -214.7  71.8 
TURKEY 120  -87.0  -82.2  59.2  -243.5  174.2 
AUSTRALIA 225  -93.1  -102.3  87.9  -448.2  135.8 
AUSTRIA 34  -105.7  -114.5  73.8  -384.5  0.8 
BELGIUM 50  -80.5  -87.7  57.5  -220.9  28.7 
CANADA 263  -104.4  -121.5  113.1  -642.9  264.4 
DENMARK 52  -94.5  -105.9  76.9  -317.2  36.4 
FINLAND 65  -84.9  -90.1  53.7  -266.5  19.8 
FRANCE 222  -74.8  -84.3  73.0  -506.7  134.3 
GERMANY 280  -63.2  -79.3  89.1  -521.3  89.7 
GREECE 100  -101.0  -104.7  57.0  -336.1  30.2 
IRELAND 17  -115.5  -118.1  84.9  -269.6  -7.0 
ITALY 103  -93.1  -96.0  55.1  -214.7  58.2 
JAPAN 1582  -69.0  -74.2  60.1  -764.0  151.4 
NETHERLANDS 62  -76.9  -85.8  61.8  -265.2  39.3 
NEW ZEALAND  30  -49.1  -54.5  73.9  -344.5  82.5 
NORWAY 51  -84.7  -106.2  97.7  -434.7  39.8 
PORTUGAL 18  -68.5  -75.9  52.6  -184.4  1.0 
SPAIN 39  -83.2  -79.6  51.6  -198.1  12.9 
SWEDEN 130  -90.4  -97.7  61.2  -263.7  37.7 
SWITZERLAND 107  -58.2  -68.9 56.6  -313.5 16.1 
UNITED KINGDOM  421  -87.8  -108.8  106.0  -619.1  80.0 




Table  2a. Summary Statistics 
 
  Obs#  Median Mean Std  Dev Min  max 
Change in stock price (log)  3823 -77.8  -81.8  66.7  -347.2  55.4 
DEF_INV  3796 0.2 0.2  0.3 0.0 1.0 
DEF_WK   3823 86.8  88.5  28.5  22.3  169.2 
Demand sensitivity  3819 1.4 1.5  0.7 -1.1  4.3 
Company size  3823 14.5  15.0  2.7 9.0 25.1 
Market/book  3823 1.5 2.4  2.8 0.3 23.6 
Beta 3778  0.64  0.71  0.65  -1.42  3.45 
Momentum 3823  20.77  26.45  37.54  -178.39  331.42 
 
Note: DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial dependence 
for working capital. Summary stats are based on listed manufacturing firms in 24 emerging economies. Change in stock 

















DEF_INV  -0.05              
DEF_WK  -0.11 0.09             
Demand sensitivity  -0.15 0.05  0.10           
Company size  0.07 0.01 -0.08  -0.04        
Market/book  -0.06 0.05  0.03  -0.03  -0.04       
Beta  -0.16 0.02  0.03  0.08  0.01 0.02     
Momentum  -0.15 0.06  0.02  0.04  0.01 -0.05  -0.10 
 
Note: DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial dependence for working capital. 
Correlations are based on listed manufacturing firms in 24 emerging economies. Change in stock price is from July 31, 07 to Dec 31, 08. All other 
variables are pre-crisis at year 2006. 




Table 3: The Average Effect of Liquidity Crunch Across Countries 
 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6  Case 7 
DEF_INV  -2.893    -1.832  0.374  0.973  -0.101 0.575 
  [10.02]    [8.276]  [8.014]  [7.164]  [6.809] [7.152] 
DEF_WK   -0.156**  -0.154**  -0.139**  -0.123**  -0.136*** -0.130** 
   [0.0627]  [0.0645]  [0.0618]  [0.0545]  [0.0510] [0.0516] 
Beta*Market Return        0.326***  0.310***  0.303*** 0.310*** 
       [0.0440]  [0.0440]  [0.0426] [0.0439] 
Firm size        1.622  1.295  2.643** 2.842** 
       [1.078]  [1.078]  [1.093] [1.090] 
Market/Book       -1.166*  -1.250*  -0.973 -0.885 
       [0.672]  [0.669]  [0.666] [0.676] 
Momentum       -0.145***  -0.144***  -0.132*** -0.128*** 
       [0.0399]  [0.0399]  [0.0397] [0.0411] 
Demand Sensitivity          -9.350***  -8.876*** -8.735*** 
         [2.062]  [2.059] [2.204] 
Leverage           -35.44*** -36.89*** 
           [4.453] [4.605] 
Trade sensitivity            -3.052 
            [2.331] 
Observations  3796  3823  3796  3751  3747  3743 3576 
R-squared  0.14  0.144  0.145  0.175  0.184  0.198 0.191 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from July 31, 07 to December 31, 08. DEF_INV is the external financial 
dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial dependence for working capital. Number of emerging countries is 24 
as listed in Table 2. Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at the sector level. 




Table 4. Pre-crisis Exposure to Capital Inflows 
 (% of GDP; Averaged from 2002 to 2006) 
 
Country  Total Inflow  FDI   FPI  Foreign Loans  developed  
Argentina 1.00  2.29  -3.21  1.92  0 
Brazil 2.11  2.26  0.11  -0.26  0 
Chile 8.41  5.61  1.43  1.38  0 
China 5.13  3.11  0.78  1.24  0 
Colombia 4.08  4.22  0.16  -0.31  0 
Czech 5.77  6.24 -2.76 2.30  0 
Egypt 4.17  3.95  0.57  -0.35  0 
HK 24.31  15.53  -6.42  15.20  0 
Hungary 11.31  5.02  2.05  4.24  0 
India 3.68  1.16  1.08  1.44  0 
Indonesia 1.48  0.96  1.34  -0.82  0 
Israel 8.23  3.93  3.53  0.78  0 
Korea 4.19  0.72  1.56  1.91  0 
Malaysia 20.07  3.05  22.73  -5.71  0 
Mexico 2.96  2.96  -0.13  0.13  0 
Pakistan 0.53  1.36  0.13  -0.96  0 
Peru 3.62  3.06  1.92  -1.36  0 
Philippines -1.70  1.55  0.29  -3.54  0 
Poland 6.95  3.68  2.58  0.70  0 
Russia 6.22  2.03  0.79  3.41  0 
Singapore 30.45  14.11  3.89  12.46  0 
South Africa  5.48  0.95  3.02  1.51  0 
Thailand 2.99  3.77  1.59  -2.37  0 
Turkey 6.55  1.52  1.90  3.13  0 
Australia 12.99  2.25  9.12  1.62  1 
Austria 24.96  6.14  10.85  7.97  1 
Belgium 10.78  10.99    -0.21  1 
Canada 5.69  2.23  2.07  1.38  1 
Denmark 14.37  1.35  4.26  8.76  1 
Finland 11.37  2.91  6.61  1.85  1 
France 21.18  2.96  9.35  8.87  1 
Germany 9.53  1.41  6.09  2.03  1 
Greece 13.05  0.67 9.47 2.90  1 
Ireland 151.06  2.89  93.81  54.36  1 
Italy 9.39  1.30  5.13  2.95  1 
Japan 0.76  0.09  2.87  -2.20  1 
Netherlands 8.21  3.84  14.81  -10.45  1 
New Zealand  9.86  3.36  2.88  3.62  1 
Norway 20.53  1.33  6.88  12.32  1 
Portugal 20.59  3.00  8.24  9.35  1 
Spain 19.95  3.09  11.76  5.10  1 
Sweden 3.61  3.94    -0.33  1 
Switzerland 15.63  2.27  0.90  12.46  1 
UK 39.56  4.00  8.89  26.67  1    31  
 
 
Table 5. Role of Pre-Crisis Exposure to Capital Inflows in Emerging Economies 
(Volume Effect) 
 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 
      
DEF_INV  -4.414 -2.488   
  [10.21] [9.098]   
DEF_INV*Inflow  0.329 0.442  0.576 
  [0.492] [0.455]  [0.424] 
DEF_WK  -0.108 -0.0504   
  [0.0772] [0.0706]   
DEF_WK*Inflow  -0.00495 -0.00778*  -0.00846* 
  [0.00524] [0.00468]  [0.00479] 
Beta*market Index   0.312***  0.285*** 
   [0.0439]  [0.0432] 
Firm size   1.281  1.317 
   [1.072]  [1.136] 
Market/Book   -1.285*  -1.404** 
   [0.669]  [0.680] 
Momentum   -0.145***  -0.144*** 
   [0.0399]  [0.0422] 
Demand Sensitivity   -9.425***   
   [2.068]   
Observations  3796 3747  3747 
R-squared  0.145 0.185  0.239 
Industry fixed effects  No  No  Yes 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from July 31, 07 to December 31, 08. 
DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial 
dependence for working capital. Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value less than 1%, 
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Table 6. Role of Pre-crisis  Exposure to Capital Inflows in Emerging Economies 
(Composition Effect) 
 
VARIABLES  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
          
DEF_INV  -4.585        
  [12.49]        
DEF_INV*FDI  2.859   3.375**  3.240*  3.480** 3.610** 
  [1.870]   [1.627]  [1.661]  [1.606]  [1.653] 
DEF_INV*FPI  -1.626*   -1.503*  -1.387*  -1.499*  -1.582* 
  [0.909]   [0.789]  [0.799]  [0.783]  [0.814] 
DEF_INV* Foreign loan  -2.531   -2.491  -2.076  -2.267  -2.38 
  [1.651]   [1.670]  [1.798]  [1.768]  [1.839] 
DEF_WK   -0.153*         
   [0.0818]         
DEF_WK*FDI    0.0441**  0.0407* 0.0308  0.0268 0.0275 
    [0.0216] [0.0226] [0.0218] [0.0207]  [0.0211] 
DEF_WK*FPI    -0.0219*** -0.0218**  -0.0198**  -0.0176** -0.0185** 
    [0.00817] [0.00862] [0.00816] [0.00770]  [0.00801] 
DEF_WK* Foreign loan    -0.0555*** -0.0585*** -0.0508*** -0.0466** -0.0473** 
    [0.0172] [0.0195] [0.0192] [0.0182]  [0.0185] 
Beta*market index      0.280***  0.276***  0.274*** 
      [0.0429]  [0.0422]  [0.0424] 
Size      1.26  2.616**  2.619** 
      [1.153]  [1.190]  [1.191] 
Market/Book      -1.357**  -0.965  -0.974 
      [0.682]  [0.701]  [0.705] 
Momentum      -0.148***  -0.140***  -0.143*** 
      [0.0419]  [0.0419]  [0.0419] 
Leverage       -34.40*** -32.60*** 
       [4.753] [6.443] 
Leverage*FDI       3.84 
        [2.729] 
Leverage*FPI       -2.833** 
        [1.226] 
Leverage*Foreign  loan        -4.154 
        [2.739] 
Sector fixed effects   No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3796  3823 3796 3747 3747  3747 
R-squared  0.142  0.145 0.216 0.242 0.254  0.256 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from July 31, 07 to December 31, 08 for manufacturing 
firms in 24 emerging economies . DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is 
the external financial dependence for working capital. Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value 
less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level.    33  
 
 
Table 7. Role of pre-Crisis Exposure to Capital Inflows 
(Robustness Checks) 
 





from 02 to 07 
De Jure 
Openness 
        
DEF_INV*FDI 3.384*  3.861**  4.186**  20.99*** 
 [1.724]  [1.786]  [1.751]  [7.856] 
DEF_INV*FPI -1.404*  -1.329  -1.543**  -8.745 
 [0.821]  [0.850]  [0.612]  [7.515] 
DEF_INV* Foreign loan  -2.116  -1.824  -2.059*  -8.568 
 [1.779]  [1.951]  [1.228]  [11.64] 
DEF_WK*FDI 0.037  0.0406*  0.0323  -0.00035 
 [0.0225]  [0.0230]  [0.0220]  [0.0888] 
DEF_WK*FPI -0.0175**  -0.0173**  -0.0153**  -0.149* 
 [0.00850]  [0.00850]  [0.00712]  [0.0901] 
DEF_WK* Foreign loan  -0.0499**  -0.0459**  -0.0332**  0.0841 
 [0.0192]  [0.0195]  [0.0140]  [0.0964] 
Beta*market index  0.279***  0.280***  0.281***  0.285*** 
 [0.0426]  [0.0426]  [0.0427]  [0.0433] 
Size 1.264  1.225  1.249  1.217 
 [1.168]  [1.163]  [1.147]  [1.127] 
Market/Book -1.361**  -1.357**  -1.358**  -1.333* 
 [0.678]  [0.681]  [0.680]  [0.685] 
Momentum -0.148***  -0.149***  -0.148***  -0.146*** 
 [0.0420]  [0.0420]  [0.0418]  [0.0422] 
(Domestic Credit/GDP)*DEF_INV  -0.03       
 [0.121]       
(Domestic Credit/GDP)*DEF_WK  -0.00189       
 [0.00124]       
(Domestic Credit and Market 
Capitalization/GDP)*DEF_INV 
 -0.0334     
   [0.0463]     
(Domestic Credit and Market 
Capitalization/GDP) *DEF_WK 
 -0.000585     
   [0.000415]     
Sector and country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3747  3747  3747  3747 
R-squared 0.243  0.243  0.242  0.24 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from July 31, 07 to December 31, 08 for manufacturing firms 
in 24 emerging economies . DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is the external 
financial dependence for working capital. Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value less than 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. 
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Table 8. Role of Pre-Crisis Exposure to Capital Inflows 
(More Robustness Checks) 
 












         
DEF_INV  0.486   0.39      
  [5.623]   [5.583]      
DEF_INV*FDI   3.119*    2.944**  1.998  2.466* 
    [1.672]   [1.399] [1.579]  [1.491] 
DEF_INV*FPI   -0.949    -1.373**  -1.012  -1.340* 
    [0.870]   [0.669] [0.708]  [0.707] 
DEF_INV* Foreign loan    -2.152    -2.3  -1.167  -1.859 
    [1.968]   [1.565] [1.614]  [1.521] 
DEF_WK  -0.122**   -0.109**      
  [0.0503]   [0.0447]      
DEF_WK*FDI   0.032    0.0227  0.0214  0.027 
    [0.0210]   [0.0174] [0.0176]  [0.0181] 
DEF_WK*FPI   -0.0212***    -0.0147**  -0.0128*  -0.0150** 
   [0.00794]    [0.00673]  [0.00720]  [0.00690] 
DEF_WK* Foreign loan    -0.0537***    -0.0372**  -0.0373**  -0.0418** 
    [0.0197]   [0.0160] [0.0165]  [0.0165] 
Beta*Market  Return 0.934*** 0.914*** 0.240*** 0.215*** 0.215***  0.232*** 
  [0.0837] [0.0813] [0.0346] [0.0334] [0.0366]  [0.0346] 
Firm size  3.845***  3.375***  0.00959  -0.0358  -1.57  -1.266 
 [1.076]  [1.093]  [0.834]  [0.880] [1.140]  [1.055] 
Market/Book -1.186*  -1.266**  -0.524 -0.637 -0.611  -0.76 
 [0.606]  [0.631]  [0.482]  [0.484] [0.461]  [0.481] 
Momentum -0.0729*  -0.0896**  -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.129***  -0.131*** 
  [0.0393] [0.0416] [0.0271] [0.0278] [0.0293]  [0.0310] 
Demand  Sensitivity  -9.378***   -6.991***      
  [2.131]   [1.601]      
Sector fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3748 3748 3748 3748 3748  3683 
R-squared  0.229 0.283 0.188 0.25  0.304  0.296 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from July 31, 07 to December 31, 08 for manufacturing firms in 24 emerging 
economies . DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial dependence for working 








Table 9. Role of Pre-crisis  Exposure to Capital Inflows in Emerging Economies 
(Non-financial firms) 
          
VARIABLES  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6  Case 7 
          
DEF_INV  -11.34   -7.1      
  [10.65]   [9.070]      
DEF_INV*FDI  1.429    1.388  2.732** 2.662** 2.994** 3.044** 
 [1.487]    [1.437]  [1.282] [1.240] [1.211] [1.206] 
DEF_INV*FPI -1.272**    -1.153**  -1.549*** -1.395**  -1.464*** -1.632*** 
 [0.496]    [0.570]  [0.548] [0.552] [0.558] [0.615] 
DEF_INV* Foreign loan  -1.267    -1.128 -2.530*  -2.202 -2.462*  -2.512* 
 [1.340]    [1.442]  [1.314] [1.344] [1.322] [1.328] 
DEF_WK    -0.117**  -0.0990**      
    [0.0572]  [0.0456]      
DEF_WK*FDI    0.0244*  0.015 0.0246**  0.018 0.0153  0.0153 
    [0.0129] [0.0114] [0.0123] [0.0119] [0.0115] [0.0116] 
DEF_WK*FPI   -0.00615  -0.00504  -0.00617 -0.00491 -0.00384 -0.0034 
   [0.00518]  [0.00436]  [0.00457] [0.00453] [0.00441] [0.00479] 
DEF_WK* Foreign loan    -0.0223*  -0.0165 -0.0237**  -0.0192*  -0.0162 -0.0161 
    [0.0125] [0.0112] [0.0115] [0.0114] [0.0110] [0.0112] 
Beta*market  index      0.297***   0.274*** 0.272*** 0.269*** 
      [0.0330]   [0.0312] [0.0306] [0.0306] 
size      2.237***   1.922**  3.354*** 3.375*** 
      [0.842]   [0.887] [0.906] [0.900] 
Market/Book      -1.293***   -1.381*** -0.966**  -1.005** 
      [0.429]   [0.437] [0.446] [0.446] 
Momentum      -0.213***   -0.201*** -0.187*** -0.187*** 
      [0.0284]   [0.0293] [0.0296] [0.0297] 
Leverage        -34.64***  -31.22*** 
        [4.104]  [5.568] 
Leverage*FDI         2.002 
         [ 2 . 2 0 0 ]  
Leverage*FPI         -2.307** 
         [ 0 . 9 2 4 ]  
Leverage*Foreign  loan         -2.117 
         [ 2 . 1 3 8 ]  
Demand  Sensitivity     -5.280***      
     [1.516]      
Sector fixed effects   No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  5997  6030 5917 5997 5917 5917 5917 
R-squared  0.13 0.127 0.176 0.201 0.235 0.248 0.25 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from July 31, 07 to December 31, 08 for non-
financial firms in 24 emerging economies. DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for investment; and 
DEF_WK is the external financial dependence for working capital. Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * 
denote p-value less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. 
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Table 10. Placebo Test 
(Stock returns from Jan 1, 06 to June 30, 07)  
 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
      
DEF_INV  -0.14  -5.243 -6.905  
  [4.629] [4.861] [5.129]  
DEF_INV*Inflow Volume    0.742     
   [0.518]     
DEF_INV*FDI     3.037*  2.366 
     [1.647]  [1.575] 
DEF_INV*FPI     -0.19  -0.403 
     [1.207]  [1.165] 
DEF_INV* Foreign loan      -2.277  -0.989 
     [2.40]  [2.477] 
DEF_WK  -0.0513 -0.0343 -0.0539  
  [0.0495] [0.0634] [0.0708]  
DEF_WK*Inflow Volume    -0.00241     
   [0.00496]     
DEF_WK*FDI     0.01  0.014 
     [0.018]  [0.017] 
DEF_WK*FPI     -0.0093  -0.0008 
     [0.0074]  [0.0066] 
DEF_WK* Foreign loan      -0.013  -0.0099 
     [0.018]  [0.017] 
Beta*market  index  0.143** 0.141** 0.143** 0.133** 
  [0.0603] [0.0599] [0.0600] [0.0574] 
Size  3.274*** 3.250*** 3.202*** 2.812*** 
  [1.063] [1.060] [1.047] [1.003] 
Market/Book  1.735*** 1.723*** 1.756*** 1.791*** 
  [0.552] [0.556] [0.554] [0.535] 
Leverage     -18.33*** 
     [6.256] 
Leverage*FDI     3.785 
     [ 2 0 . 4 0 ]  
Leverage*FPI     2.079 
     [ 1 1 . 6 2 ]  
Leverage*Foreign  loan     19.61 
     [ 2 4 . 2 6 ]  
Demand Sensitivity  0.0694  0.0835  0.065   
  [3.661] [3.676] [3.670]  
Sector fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  3693 3693 3693 3693 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from Jan 1, 06 to July 30, 07 for 
manufacturing firms in 24 emerging economies. DEF_INV is the external financial dependence 
for investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial dependence for working capital. 
Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. 




Table 11. Stock Returns around Lehman Brother Bankruptcy 
 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
           
DEF_INV -0.0895    -0.11  -0.164     
  [0.622]   [0.597] [0.397]     
DEF_INV*FDI  0.332**   0.284** 0.291**  0.316***  0.330*** 
  [0.129]   [0.115] [0.116]  [0.117]  [0.121] 
DEF_INV*FPI -0.144*    -0.118  -0.0708  -0.0715  -0.0767 
  [0.0784]   [0.0814] [0.0915]  [0.0993]  [0.108] 
DEF_INV* Foreign loan  -0.255*   -0.184  -0.182  -0.201  -0.226 
  [0.134]   [0.126] [0.146]  [0.153]  [0.169] 
DEF_WK   -0.00177  -0.00127  0.00297     
   [0.00502]  [0.00509]  [0.00452]     
DEF_WK*FDI   0.00283*  0.00233  0.00163  0.00143  0.00187 
   [0.00149]  [0.00148]  [0.00143] [0.00152] [0.00155] 
DEF_WK*FPI   -0.00128  -0.0011 -0.00113  -0.00127*  -0.00163** 
   [0.000775]  [0.000731]  [0.000703] [0.000753] [0.000810] 
DEF_WK* Foreign loan    -0.00373**  -0.00338** -0.00290*  -0.00278 -0.00352* 
   [0.00169]  [0.00164]  [0.00161] [0.00174] [0.00185] 
Beta*market  index      0.498***  0.486***  0.472*** 
      [0.0283]  [0.0302]  [0.0315] 
Firm  size      0.371***  0.368***  0.405*** 
      [0.0690]  [0.0735]  [0.0759] 
Market/Book     -0.00513  0.00548  0.00728 
      [0.0265]  [0.0318]  [0.0331] 
Leverage        -1.427**  -1.596** 
        [0.632]  [0.620] 
Leverage*FDI        0.201  0.187 
        [0.185]  [0.197] 
Leverage*FPI        -0.0545  -0.0511 
        [0.0900]  [0.0924] 
Leverage*Foreign  loan        -0.257  -0.25 
        [0.191]  [0.204] 
Demand  Sensitivity      -0.0941     
      [0.107]     
Sector fixed effects  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3775 3802  3775 3771  3771  3644 
R-squared  0.151 0.15  0.152 0.227  0.252  0.252 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the change of stock price (log)  from September 12 to 16, 2008. DEF_INV is the external financial dependence for 
investment; and DEF_WK is the external financial dependence for working capital. Standard errors in brackets;  ***, **, and * denote p-value 
less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level.  Case 6 replicates Case 5 but drops stocks with illiquid 
trading,  which is defined as few than five days of trading in the two months of July and August, 2008, before  Lehman’s bankruptcy.      38  
 
 
Figure 1: Capital Flow to Emerging Economies
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The sample includes 24 emerging economies listed in Table 4.  Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database.   
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On the vertical axis is log (capital inflow/GDP) in 2009 - log (capital inflow/GDP) in 2007, and on the 
horizontal axis is the share of FDI inflow in the country’s total inflow in 2007. The volumes of capital 
inflow in 2009 are estimates by the IMF. The slope coefficient is 2.64 with a standard error of 1.76.    39  
 
 
Figure 3. Change in Log Banking Stock Prices vs Pre-Crisis International Bank Loans 
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Note: On the vertical axis is the change in log bank-sector stock price from July 1
st , 2007 to December 31, 
2008. On the horizontal axis is the pre-crisis inflow of loans/GDP averaged over 2002-2006. This partial 
scatter plot is conditioned on pre-crisis foreign direct investments and portfolio investments over GDP. The 
slope coefficient is -6.38 with a standard error of 3.24. Source: IMF’s WEO database and Datastream. 
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Appendix Table 1. De Jure Financial Openness for Year 2006 
Country  Stocks  Bonds  Commercial Credit  Financial credit  FDI 
Argentina 0  0  1  0  0 
Brazil 0  1  1  1  0 
Chile 1  1  1  1  1 
China 0  0  0  0  0 
Colombia 0  0  0  0  0 
Czech 0  1  1  1  0 
Egypt 1  1  1  1  0 
HK 1  1  1  1 1 
Hungary 1  1  1  1  1 
India 0  0  0  0  0 
Indonesia 0  0  0  1  0 
Israel 1  1  1  1  1 
Korea 1  1  1  1  0 
Malaysia 1  1  0  0  0 
Mexico 0  1  1  0  0 
Pakistan 1  1  1  1  0 
Peru 1  1  1  1  1 
Philippines 1  0  0  0  1 
Poland 1  0  1  0  0 
Russia 0  0  1  0  0 
Singapore 1  1  1  1  1 
South Africa  1  1  1  0  1 
Thailand 0  0  0  1  1 
Turkey 1  1  0  0  1 
Source: The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions in 2006. 
 